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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN MORTGAGE LOAN 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
COTTONWOOD CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a corporation, et al., 
Def end ants, 
* * * * * 
OSCAR E. CHYTRAUS COMPANY, 
INC., a corporation, GIBBONS & 
REED CONCRETE PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, a corporation, RICHARD 
P. GARRICK, BOISE CASCADE 
CORPORATION, d/b/a BESTWAY 
BUILDING CENTER, a corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
10516 
Struggling to transform their optional agreement into 
an obligatory one, respondents introduced in their an-
swering brief a number of unsowm factual assertions 
1msupported by either pleading or record. 
2 
These include : 
. 1. The assertion at page 3 concerning alleged com-
mitment off funds by virtue of alleged transactions be-
tween Western and First Security. 
2. The assertion at page 4 concerning recording of 
the mortgage prior to furnishing of labor or materials. 
3. The assertion at page 4 concerning demand by 
Western on Cottonwood for lien waivers. 
4. The assertion at page 5 concerning an alleged 
agreement between the lien claimants and Western where-
in Western was to finish the project by making funds 
available, etc. 
5. The assertion at pages 5 and 6 that on the strength 
of such agreement Western finished the project. 
These factual assertions are not cited to the record; 
they are not supported by the record; they are interjected 
for the first time on appeal, not having been presented 
to or passed on by the trial court. 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
THE NON-MOVING PARTY IS OBLIGED TO 
' Had these assertions been timely raised below, appellants would have 
denied and controverted them. For example, in items 4 and 5 resp~n?ents 
assert an alleged agreement and that in reliance thereon W~stern fm1shed 
the project. Appellants would show this to be false for_ while there wer~ 
negotiations looking toward sue~ an _ag~eemcnt, tJ:e written drah as pre 
pared by Western's counsel require? s1g~mg by all mterested parties bef?re 
it could become effective and that m pomt of fact, Western refused. t? sigf 
it. See the admission of Western's counsel at page 29 of the depo_s1t10n ° 
James Reed (R. 153) to the ef[ect that the agreement was never signed by 
all parties and thus never came mto full legal effect. 
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BRING ADDITIONAL FACTS, IF SUCH EXIST, 
TO THE ATTENTION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN 
THE MANNER PROVIDED FOR BY RULE 56 
' UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
The various matters asserted as facts by repondents 
in their answering brief but which are not supported by 
the record or by the pleadings were not presented to the 
trial court as is required by Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, if such matters are to be considered in opposi-
tion to appellants' motion for summary judgment. 
Rule 56 ( c) provides, in part pertinent, 
The adverse party prior to the day of hear-
ing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
As pointed out at 6 Moore, Federal Practice, para-
graph 56.11 [ 1], "Material which does not come within 
the above broad category should not be considered" by 
the trial court on a motion for summary judgment. Mat-
ters specifically rejected include unsworn factual asser-
tions unsupported by the record made by counsel in briefs. 
See, e.g., Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F. 2d 20 (C.A. D.C. 
1952) ; Proctor v. Sagamore Big Game Club, 265 F. 2d 
196 (3 Cir. 1959); United States v. Lot 800, 169 F. Supp. 
904 (D.C. D.C. 1959). In this last case, the court ex-
plained 
"The fact issues claimed to exist are not prop-
erly set forth in the answer or by means of affi-
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davit but are merely listed at page 7 of both of 
defendants' memoranda .... By reason of their 
source and their nature, these questions do not 
~orm a sound basis for determining that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists in this case." 
Not having been properly presented to the trial 
court below, interjection of such new factual material at 
the appellate stage is, a fortiori, improper. In Wat kins v. 
Simonds, 14 Utah 2cl 406, 385 P. 2d 154 (1963), this 
Court said, at page 155, "In any event, this court can-
not consider facts stated in the briefs which may be true 
but absent in the official record." See also Reliable Furni-
ture Co. v. Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 
14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P. 2d 134 (1963); Cooper v. For-
esters Underwriters, Inc., 123 Utah 215, 257 P. 2d 540 
( 1954); Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 
264 ( 1947). 
POINT II. 
BENNETT V. WORCESTER COUNTY NA-
TIONAL BANK DOES NOT SUPPORT RESPON-
DENTS' POSITION THAT THE MORTGAGEE'S 
EXPENDITURES AFTER DEFAULT TAKE PRIOR-
ITY OVER THE LIENORS, BUT, ON THE CON-
TRARY, SUPPORTS THE APPELLANTS' POSI-
TION THAT SUCH EXPENDITURES TAKE PRI-
ORITY ONLY AS MADE. 
Respondents rely heavily upon the recent case of Ben-
nett v. Worcester County National Bank, 213 N. E. 2d 
254 (Mass. 1966) for the proposition that the ex pen di-
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tures admittedly voluntarily made by Western after Cot-
onwood's default are to be given priority as of the date 
of the recording of the mortgage. Throughout their brief 
respondents utilize the old Madison Avenue technique of 
frequent, narcotizing repetition to assert the myth that 
construction loans, despite the substantive terms of the 
transaction between the parties, take priority over ma-
terialmen's liens. At page 28 of their brief they assert 
that Bennett supports the position that "The loan agree-
ment is the vehicle adopted by the parties to accomplish 
this end [erection of a completed structure], and its pro-
visions, including those governing rights upon breach, are 
secured by the mortgage. (Emphasis in original) 
However, examination of Bennett reveals that it does 
not support respondents' position, but, if anything, sup-
ports appellants' position that expenditures admittedly 
voluntarily made by Western subsequent to Cottonwood's 
default can take priority only as of the date of each such 
expenditure. 
In Bennett, the mortgage expressly provided that it 
was to be security for the performance of the construc-
tion loan agreement. At page 255 the court said 
The language of the mortgage makes it clear 
that it was executed to secure not only repayment 
of the . . . note, but also performance of all the 
terms of the construction loan agreement. 
In the instant case, however, while the mortgage -
the only document placed of record - refers to the note, 
neither mortgage or note refers in any manner whatsoever 
to the collateral agreements between the parties, let alone 
that the mortgage be security for the performance of the 
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consruction loan agreement. In point of fact, wordy as it 
is, the mortgage discreetly avoids any reference to the pos-
sibility that the loan might be used for construction pur-
poses. It is phrased throughout as though the premises 
were already fully improved. 
This distinction between Bennett and the instant 
transaction is significant, for the Bennett decision is lim-
ited to those cases where the mortgage expressly secures 
the performance of the loan agreement. It is clear that in 
cases like the instant one where the mortgage does not 
secure the performance of the loan agreement but is mis-
leadingly silent as to the nature of the true agreement, 
the rationale of Bennett would compel a holding that the 
admittedly voluntarily made expenditures subsequent to 
Cottonwood's default are able to take priority only as 
made. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein and in appellants' ini-
tial brief, appellants respectfully pray that this court grant 
the relief requested in appellants' initial brief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL 
& McCARTHY 
By Ray G. Martineau 
C. Keith Rooker 
Attorneys for Appellant, Oscar E. 
Chytraus Company, Inc. 
Suite 300, 141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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